Economics and Mechanisms Economics, economic theory, and mechanism design

28Jan/120

Open science: why is it so hard?

OK, I am becoming obsessed with Lemire's blog. One more post from there now, and back to my own work I go. Incidentally, the book by Michael Nielsen discussed below is sitting in my queue of e-books I really should be reading yesterday. (Once again, I have snipped most of the text of the post, for which I strongly recommend that you visit the source.) And before I go, let me obey Lemire's injunction and repeat: scholarship is not a publishing business.

Open science: why is it so hard?:

 

[Snip…]

Thus, a much more significant vision is Nielsen’s open science. Michael Nielsen is arguing for a culture shift in science: from a science obsessed with individual performance (and publications) to a science culture resembling more that of open source software or wikipedia.

I fear however that despite all the (well deserved) press that Michael Nielsen’s latest book has been getting, too few people understand the importance of this shift. It is not about becoming hippies. It is not a socialist utopia. On the contrary, the system we have right now is akin to an highly regulated industry. All power is in the hands of the government and a few large organizations (universities, publishers) working in tandem. The barrier to entry is maintained artificially high. Open science is really about creating “open markets” with freer exchanges. It has the potential to boost our collective productivity by orders of magnitude through the removal of unneeded friction.

[Snip…]

And we finally get a hint at why it is so hard it is to open up science: the business of science has become intertwined with businesses like the publishing business. ACM has to speak both as an association of computing professionals, and as a publishing house.

What should be a critical support service, the publication of results, ends up driving much of our culture. The journals become the science. The medium becomes the message.

In effect, we have too much organizational scarring tissue in science. It could be that we need to reboot the system. As a starting point, we should collectively recognize the problem. Repeat after me: scholarship is not a publishing business.

Further reading:

Update:

The ACM charges the authors of any conference for the publication of proceedings. However, they do not require payment for publishing in their journals: instead they request page charges.

(Via Daniel Lemire's blog)

Filed under: Commons, Science No Comments
28Jan/120

How to revise research papers after receiving harsh reviews

I just learned of Daniel Lemire's blog from a post by Noam Nisan on Google+. The following post from Lemire's blog is so good I had to fight the temptation to quote its entirety here. I heartily recommend it, and the whole blog, to you, gentle reader. Do not waste time; go visit it now.

How to revise research papers after receiving harsh reviews:

Whether you submit your work scientific journal or just post it on a blog, you can expect to receive harsh criticism from time to time. Sometimes you are facing arrogant or ignorant readers. Other times, your work is genuinely flawed. My own work is frequently flawed, as you know if you read this blog.

Over time, I have learned that even if the reviewer is wrong, spending time to careful respond can be tremendously useful. If you are 100% correct, then you get to build up your confidence and can later answer similar criticism hastily. Very often, however, you did not do everything perfectly. Maybe your arguments and data are correct, but you might have presented them better.

There are specific strategies to deal with harsh reviews:

(Snipped. Excellent practical advice is here, but I really think you should go read the original post!)

(Via Daniel Lemire's blog)

Filed under: Science No Comments
25May/110

Object-oriented thinking in economics

I have been meddling with the programming language Python for some years now in order to become self-sufficient in programming simulations. In doing so, I learned the basics of object-oriented computer programming (OOP for short).

OOP is a style of writing computer programs, with some languages, such as Java, heavily supporting it (Java enforces it, in fact) and other languages, such as Python, supporting it strongly. Coming to OOP from economics was conceptually easy. Now I am thinking that OOP has something to tell us regarding how we teach economics or how we present it to the wider world. This post is my first written rumination on this topic.

First, let me define an object in the OOP sense. I need to give you some background first. I expect you are aware, even if you never wrote any computer code, that such code is a string of data, ultimately encoded in binary notation, that tells the computer to do certain things with part of this data. To take a simple example, if you want the computer to choose randomly between the names of participants in a lottery, you have to include the names in your program (data) and write commands that result in one of these names being chosen randomly and this choice being communicated to the user. This little program has data (it "knows" some things) and it has ways of acting on these data (it "knows" what to do with the things it knows).

In any reasonably complicated programming problem, it helps us as programmers to compartmentalize the code. We make a chunk of code to perform task A, another to perform task B, and so on, and finally we write code to coordinate these chunks as they go along merrily doing their thing. Each one of these code chunks has some data it knows and some things it can do with the data it knows. (Computer scientists, I know I am simplifying. I only want to convey the basics of OOP here.) An object in OOP language is a chunk of code that has some data and some things it can do (usually called "methods", but you can think of them as commands specific to this chunk). The programming language in which you are specifying these objects provides ways for objects to communicate with each other, passing data around, and to ask each other to perform one of its methods (execute one of the commands it has).

How is this relevant to economics? You are probably already chomping at the bit to answer, but here is my take. When we set up any model in economics, at least if our model is "microfounded" as we say, we have some agents who know certain things and do certain things. Suppose, for example, that you want to make a computer model of an exchange economy. You need a number of individuals, each with an endowment and a preference relation over the commodity space. These individuals need to be able to perceive prices, decide which net trades are feasible given a particular price vector, and, finally, they need to be able to propose and execute trades with each other. (OK, maybe you wanted a Walrasian auctioneer thrown in as well? I leave it as an exercise then to determine what data and which methods the auctioneer object in the code will need.)

I cannot think of a mainstream economics model that cannot be conceptualized in these terms. Indeed, computational economics has flourished in the last several years and you can find plenty of examples of what I am talking about by visiting, for example, the amazingly comprehensive website that Leigh Tesfatsion has set up. (This kind of "microfounded" computational economics goes by the name agent-based computational economics.)

So why don't we teach our students using the concept that each economic agent in our models is an object (in the OOP sense) that interacts with others based on rules set up by the institutional infrastructure of the economy and physical feasibility conditions?

I can think of two answers right now, one deeper than the other. I will examine each one and argue that they do not convince me, starting with the shallower one.

The shallow answer is that our students will find it hard to understand the OOP language of objects and their interactions. I am much more likely to agree that our students in introductory courses will not understand supply and demand graphs or the simple linear equations we try to use to overcome their math anxieties. But almost all students in introductory courses will have played computer games. For them, all you have to do to introduce OOP objects is to refer to an avatar in an online role-playing game or a tile in Tetris. Stepping from these examples to explaining economic objects in code does not in fact impose the need for a computer language at all. You can use pseudo-code and the ideas stand; any time your students feel shaky, just bring in another computer-game inspired example.

The deeper answer is that while encapsulating an individual in an exchange economy in the language of OOP objects is easy, if we start thinking in the algorithmic terms this mental shift suggests, things like arriving at a Walrasian equilibrium become hard problems. There might even be a student in your class who knows enough computer science and will tell you to your face that our cavalier approach of taking shortcuts like calculating an equilibrium with Lagrange multiplier techniques and setting supply equal to demand is a rotten approach, as it hides the remarkably difficult problem of arriving at an equilibrium.

So how can I deal with this answer? My point is that we should adopt the OOP viewpoint precisely so as to force our students or readers to confront the fact that reaching an equilibrium in an economic model is much trickier a proposition than the typical paper in Econometrica or JET lets on. As economists, we have internalized the mental shortcuts that make us jump to equilibria in fairly complicated models and then analyze the properties of these equilibria. But there is much to be learned by confronting the need to specify exactly how economic agents interact in time, each with its own data an abilities to perform actions such as buying and selling, manage to get to an equilibrium (if they do). Do we really want a Walrasian auctioneer who gropes around in price space to find an equilibrium? What if the economy happens not to have a stable equilibrium (the question can arise whether we are looking at a market model or any other kind of agent-based model). These are not idle concerns; they show clearly some of the limitations of economic theorizing and to ignore them is intellectual arrogance at best, dishonesty at worst.

There is one final point in my mind about this, which I will leave to be developed in a future post. Thinking in terms of institutional infrastructure can be considered the overall code of our economic computer program. This can encompass the ways information gets passed around from agent to agent as the economy operates as well as the outcome function that determines what allocations occur and when as the agents take various actions. The more precise we are in specifying these the better, just as much as the more careful we are to specify computable ways to reach an equilibrium (see the previous paragraph) the better. As this post already exceeds 1250 words, however, this final point will have to be explored later.

3Mar/100

The degradation of US democracy

Read this post by Daniel Little and weep. If you care about democracy and the public good, that is. This kind of thing is a main reason that standard economics has done a serious disservice to humanity by emphasizing the private motivations of individuals and not studying public mindedness and the "public good" in general very much. We can still hope to make strides to reverse this inattention to publicness in economics and also in the political sphere. At least, I sincerely hope so.

18Feb/100

What chess champion Gary Kasparov can teach us

Recently, Gary Kasparov wrote an essay about humans and computers playing chess, under the guise of a book review. Andrew McAfee today published an essay on Kasparov's ideas, with a specific focus on one observation by Kasparov.

Kasparov noted that recent matches have shown that weak human chess players with computers can beat a chess supercomputer, and, in addition, a chess grandmaster with a computer but a weak organization of the human-computer collaboration. In Kasparov's words,

Weak human + machine + better process was superior to a strong computer alone and, more remarkably, superior to a strong human + machine + inferior process.

McAfee starts from this and says that Kasparov may have stumbled upon a better model of business processes. From my point of view, I see Kasparov's insight as one example of the great benefit to be gotten if we can only adapt mechanism design theory to capture the fuzziness of humans and the precision of computers, acting in tandem, better. (I think there are many examples to urge us to change mechanism design towards more human-compatible decision-making models, on which I plan to blog more.)

I am making no grand claim that I know how we can approach this goal. I am simply noting that it seems a very worthy goal, one that I would rather see research in mechanism design aim for. Instead, the current thrust of the mainstream mechanism design research seems to be to get more and more refined mathematical results based on the assumption that the actors in the mechanisms studied, whether human or computer agents, behave with the precision of computers. I am aware of some work that attempts to introduce errors in the decision-making of agents in mechanism design theory, such as work by Kfir Eliaz, but I would certainly love it if more of the very clever mechanism theorists attacked the fuzziness problem head on.

Let us not leave the topic of a better business process to Harvard Business Review articles only. Some Econometrica articles on it, please.

11Feb/100

Posting hiatus to end soon

A bit backed up by the semester's start and snow blizzards, but I intend to post more soon and also to expand the pages on mechanisms, public economics, and networks.

Filed under: Uncategorized No Comments
3Jan/100

Incentives matter and monopolies are terrible

Monopoly (or near monopoly) is always very bad for consumers. Check out this article from OSnews.com about Intel's compiler that goes to some lengths to handicap non-Intel processors. I got more and more thankful for the free software folks (think GNU compiler) and all open source contributors as I was reading this. Yes, I am writing this on an iMac that has an Intel processor. I wish I could fight monopolies effectively on my own...

3Jan/100

Academic textbooks and healthcare incentives compared – Boing Boing

The always interesting Boing Boing blog has a long post on the market for academic textbooks and makes explicit comparisons of the incentives in this market and in the U.S. healthcare system. I won't quote from the article, as it is good enough for me to recommend you to read it in whole, along with the comments, several of which are good also. I will say that I am making some progress in this area, having for the first time given students several weeks' notice about the textbooks I am going to use in the upcoming spring semester. Next year, I will try to substitute some creative commons sources for textbooks, but it will be hard, and very hard for my graduate courses.

29Nov/090

Lecture Notes on Dominant Strategy Implementation

Rather later than I was hoping, I am posting my lecture note on dominant strategy implementation. The notes are for my graduate microeconomics course at Temple University, and the book referenced is my book A Toolbox for Economic Design, co-authored with Karen A. Campbell, Emina I. Cardamone, Scott Deacle, and Lisa A. Delgado. The book covers this topic in chapter 2.

18Oct/090

The pundits’ dilemma

Mark Liberman says this in the Language Log today, among other good points:

Overall, the promotion of interesting stories in preference to accurate ones is always in the immediate economic self-interest of the promoter. It's interesting stories, not accurate ones, that pump up ratings for Beck and Limbaugh.  But it's also interesting stories that bring readers to The Huffington Post and to Maureen Dowd's column, and it's interesting stories that sell copies of Freakonomics and Super Freakonomics.  In this respect, Levitt and Dubner are exactly like Beck and Limbaugh.

We might call this the Pundit's Dilemma — a game, like the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the player's best move always seems to be to take the low road, and in which the aggregate welfare of the community always seems fated to fall. And this isn't just a game for pundits. Scientists face similar choices every day, in deciding whether to over-sell their results, or for that matter to manufacture results for optimal appeal.

In the end, scientists usually over-interpret only a little, and rarely cheat, because the penalties for being caught are extreme.  As a result, in an iterated version of the game, it's generally better to play it fairly straight.  Pundits (and regular journalists) also play an iterated version of this game — but empirical observation suggests that the penalties for many forms of bad behavior are too small and uncertain to have much effect. Certainly, the reputational effects of mere sensationalism and exaggeration seem to be negligible.

Mark Thoma says, among other things, this, in the post that brought Liberman's post to my attention:

I'm not sure I know the answer to that, but I suspect it has something to do with increased competition among media companies for eyeballs and ears combined with an agency problem that causes information organizations to maximize something other than the output of credible information (maximizing profit may not be the same as maximizing the output of factual, useful information).

Though this type of behavior was always present in the media, it seems to have gotten much worse with the proliferation of cable channels and other media as information technology developed beyond the old fashioned antennas on roofs receiving analog signals. I don't want to go back to the days where we had an oligopolistic structure for the provision of news (especially on network TV), competitive markets are much better, but there seems to be a divergence between what is optimal for the firm and what is socially optimal due to the agency problem.

Some people have argued that there are big externalities to good and bad reporting, and therefore that "some kind of tax credit scheme for non-entertainment news reporting might enhance societal efficiency and welfare." That might help to change incentives, but I'm not sure it solves the fundamental agency problem. There must be reputation effects that matter to the firm, some way of making the firms pay a cost for bad pundit behavior. But that is up to the public at large, people must reward good behavior and penalize bad, it is not something the government can control. I suppose we could try something like British libel laws to partially address this, but looking at the UK press does not convince me that this solves the problem.

So I don't know what the answer is.

I would not want to jump in and say that I know what the answer is. However, it is clear that there is a mechanism design question here. The economist's knee-jerk reaction to this would be "if the consumers of information are more interested in being entertained than informed, then it is efficient to provide them entertainment as long as the marginal cost of entertaining each one of them meets her/his marginal willingness to pay". As Thoma notes, it is noted that reporting has external effects. These would seem to push us in the direction of amending the rule for social optimality and looking for ways to align pundits' incentives to what efficiency would require.

But if the majority of the audience want to be entertained and not informed, shouldn't we economists, as children of the Enlightenment, bow to the consumers', our multitudinous Kings', desires? To take the idea that bad reporting carries negative externalities seriously, one has to take seriously the possibility that people express preferences for the wrong things, things that will in the long term, collectively conspire to harm them. Is this only because of the word "collectively" and so only a question of externalities, one step removed? I think that there is more "irrationality" to consumers than that. We need to come to grips, as we consider mechanism design, with "irrational consumers". The misnamed "behavioral economics" (all economics is behavioral) field has some valuable ideas here. It seems to me economic theorists of the mechanism-design bent, should adopt these ideas and do their formalizing magic with them to reach some results. After all, no lesser theorist than Leonid Hurwicz made a foray into "irrational" agents all the way back in the 1980s.

Remark: I always place "irrational" and "rational" within quotation marks. Given what I know of game theory, including Binmore's work on the application of Goedel's Theorem on games played by automata, and games such as the Prisoners' Dilemma and the Centipede, I feel I have no way of even pretending that I know what "rational behavior" really ought to mean in the case of individuals interacting in a game. Worse, in the context of consumer not knowing "what's good for them", we have an additional level of "irrationality" which seems to resolve to time inconsistency in the behavior of a single person. This post being long enough, I have to leave further development on my thoughts on these points to another post.